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Engendering harm: a critique of sex selection for “family 
balancing” 
 
Abstract 
The most benign rationale for sex-selection is deemed to be “family 
balancing.” On this view, provided the sex-distribution of an existing 
offspring group is “unbalanced,” one may legitimately use 
reproductive technologies to select the sex of the next child. I present 
four novel concerns with granting “family balancing” as a justification 
for sex-selection: (a) families or family subsets should not be subject 
to medicalization; (b) sex selection for “family balancing” entrenches 
heteronormativity, inflicting harm in at least three specific ways; (c) 
the logic of affirmative action is appropriated; (d) the moral mandate 
of reproductive autonomy is misused. I conclude that the harms 
caused by “family balancing” are sufficiently substantive to over-ride 
any claim arising from a supposed right to sex selection as an 
instantiation of procreative autonomy.  
 
1. Introduction 
At the start of 2015, a bill was debated in UK parliament which promised to make 
sex-selective abortion illegal. While the bill was ultimately rejected (Department 
of Health 2015), its driving concern is substantive. Though conventionally 
associated with particular cultures and locations (e.g. India, China, and South 
Korea), mild son-preference1 is in fact observed across many cultures globally, 
                                                 
1  There is a notable exception to this trend. In the US, most of those using Microsort 
sperm sorting request a female embryo. However, the reason for this is likely to be linked to the 
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especially for first-borns (c.f. Bandyopadhyay 2014; Steinbacher and Ericsson 
1994; Pebley and Westoff 1982), and while sex selection may not be common 
across all geographies, sex-differential treatment (and, ipso facto, health 
outcomes) is widely observed (Van Balen and Inhorn 2003; Hill and Upchurch 
1995). Given that subtle and overt male privilege is written into social structures 
globally, son-preference may be seen as a rational choice,2 at least in the short 
term.  
Most analyses voice reservations about unregulated sex selection, firstly because 
of consequentialist concerns about the unpredictable effects of upsetting the sex-
ratio in the population at large, second because the very act of sex selection is 
sexist. While many commentators express moral condemnation (Seavilleklein and 
Mudde 2010; Strange and Chadwick 2009; Sherwin 2007; McDougall 2005), and 
recommend either prohibition or strict regulation, others, whose work centres on 
procreative liberty (e.g. Savulescu 1999; Robertson 2001; Harris 2005; Dahl 
2004), argue in favour of sex-selection as an exercise of reproductive autonomy. 
Amongst those opposed to non-medical sex selection, an exception is often made. 
Sex selection for the purposes of “family balancing” is generally considered to be 
permissible, often with little or no explanation. Dickens (2002, 336) considers that 
“prohibitions are unnecessary and oppressive where there is no sex bias but only a 
wish to balance a family with children of both sexes.” Grant (2006, 1659) 
remarks, without further comment, that “there appears to be some consensus that 
a sex preference is ethical if the existing family is a single sex-sibship.” McMillan 
(2002, 30) supports sex-selection for “family balancing,” and recommends that 
potential abuses be minimised by changing the UK’s Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority guidelines to match those of US private clinic Microsort, 
who perform non-medical selection only when “the applicants are married, have 
                                                                                                                                     
fact that Microsort promises higher success rates for female embryos: a 91 per cent success rate, 
compared with a 76 per cent success rate for males (Grady, 2007). A 2011 survey by US-based 
research consultancy Gallup Inc. found that if only permitted to have one child, 40 per cent of 
participants would prefer a son, and 28 per cent a daughter (Newport, 2011).  
2  Consider that sons will have higher lifetime earnings, have access to a wider range of 
professional opportunities, will not incur dowry payments (where relevant), will in most cases 
keep the family name,  are unlikely to be subject to sexual and-or domestic violence, etc.    
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at least one child, and want to select for the sex that is less common in the 
family.”3 Pennings (1996, 2339) notes that “family balancing is intuitively 
accepted by a majority of the population […] In Western societies, parents wish to 
have a well-balanced family in terms of sex.” 
Libertarian ethicists argue that one should not restrict freedoms where one cannot 
demonstrate harms, therefore they believe that sex selection for the purposes of 
“family balancing” should be permitted. Provided it is adequately regulated, it is 
argued that sex-selection amongst sibling groups for the purposes of “family 
balancing” will not upset the population sex ratio. Further, proponents claim that 
sex selection for “family balancing” is not motivated by, and does not motivate, 
sexism, since it is chosen in response to the sex(es) of existing offspring. I will 
show that this second justification is mistaken, and will present additional reasons 
for maintaining a moral condemnation of sex selection, even in cases of “family 
balancing.”  
I will not address the claim that sex selection for “family balancing” is preferable 
to sex selection simpliciter because it does not upset the population sex-ratio, but 
will say only this: the surest way to not upset the population sex-ratio is to permit 
no sex selection for any reason. Biology ensures parity (to all intents and 
purposes) in the adult sex ratio (Hesketh and Xing 2006). “Fixing” local, entirely 
random, variations in sex-ratios may affect the overall ratio in some way, because 
there will likely be trends in the views of the parents who are perturbed by family 
“imbalance” which may amount, say, to a net son-preference (this trend is in fact 
noted in empirical work by McGowan and Sharp (2012, 284)). Regardless, it is 
not clear that a slightly “upset” population sex-ratio would in itself be a problem, 
even if it may be a symptom of a very serious social issue. The reasons for 
concern offered in the literature are themselves far more concerning. For example, 
Dahl suggests that an uneven sex ratio would lead to “an overabundance of males 
                                                 
3   The requirements have since changed, and reassuringly no longer require the couple to 
be married, but I include McMillan's endorsement since he presumably agreed with this additional 
requirement, given that the requirement still applied at the time of the paper’s publication. I do so 
in order to demonstrate a prejudice towards heteronormativity within the provision of reproductive 
technologies themselves, and amongst many interlocutors who uncritically endorse them.  
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who, once grown up, will be unable to find a mate and may resort to prostitution, 
molestation, rape, and other sex related crimes” (2005, 88). It seems odd and 
irresponsible to suggest that these crimes can be prevented by the presence of 
greater numbers of women, rather than changes in underlying cultures which 
underwrite violence against women and girls.   
My discussion will close with the conclusion that sex-selection for the purpose of 
“family balancing” is indefensible, and the recommendation that it should be 
legislated against. In most jurisdictions—including the UK—this is already the 
case, but the prohibition may founder as genetic selection is normalised for other 
purposes. As with any prohibition on moral grounds, convention dictates that one 
must swim upstream against the presumed primacy of individual liberty (c.f. Dahl 
2004). I have my own views on the ideology of this presumption, but will 
dutifully take on the challenge here. My aim is therefore to show that the harms 
incurred if sex-selection for “family balancing” is permitted are sufficiently great 
to outweigh claims of the right to individual reproductive autonomy. As such, I 
will argue that the concept of “family balancing” is harmful because it: 
(1) medicalises the family; 
(2) is heteronormative (i.e.: sexist, homophobic, and transphobic); 
(3) appropriates the logic of affirmative action; 
(4) is an abuse of reproductive autonomy. 
 
One might wonder why such a specific theme within the topic of sex-selection is 
worthy of lengthy analysis. Family balancing is a common motivation for sex 
selection in Western contexts, with studies showing that 30 per cent of those 
surveyed in Germany, and 68 per cent of those surveyed in the UK (Dahl et al. 
2003), desiring an equal number of sons and daughters. Since the literature frames 
“family-balancing” as the most legitimate purpose of sex-selection, if this 
rationale can be shown to be indefensible, or shown to be no more defensible than 
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justifications which have been dismissed on other grounds, then the overall case 
in favour of sex-selection is weakened.  
The text is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces sex selection and “family 
balancing.” Section 3 describes the way in which the rhetoric of “family 
balancing” medicalizes the family unit. Section 4 explores the various 
problematic ways in which sex selection invokes heteronormativity. Sections 5 
and 6, respectively, propose that “family balancing” illegitimately co-opts the 
logic of affirmative action, and is a misuse of the broader principle of 
reproductive autonomy. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. What is family “balancing”? 
First, a note on language. I adopt the terminology most commonly used in this 
literature, and refer to “sex selection.” This is apt in one sense, since it is the sex 
of a future child that is being selected using available technologies. It is not so apt 
in another sense, since the intention of the parent is invariably to produce 
particular stereotypical gendered features, i.e. parents wish to raise a “boy” or a 
“girl” according to the social meanings of those terms (Nugent 2013; Kane 2009; 
Goldberg 2009). I will describe the sex-gender distinction in more detail in 
section 4, but suffice to say that my writing will intentionally move between the 
terms sex (selection) and gender (selection) in order to track the correct referent 
for that particular context. If this seems confusing it is because the terms are being 
conflated by those requesting sex selection. 
Sex selection may be achieved in any of four ways. In increasing order of moral 
concern: (a) pre-conception sperm sorting may be used to choose an X or Y 
chromosome, (b) pre-implantation embryo sorting may be used to select an 
embryo of the correct sex, (c) an abortion may be carried out following the 
determination of the sex of the foetus, or (d) the child may be killed, 
malnourished, or refused medical attention after birth. Only (c) is currently legal 
in the UK, but all are in operation globally.  
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Left to the vagaries of nature, the population sex-ratio tends to be around 105-107 
male births for every 100 female births (Hesketh and Xing 2006). Since the egg’s 
surface is as receptive to X-chromosome sperm cells as to Y-chromosome sperm 
cells, the selection of chromosomes is essentially random, with the minor 
departure from parity believed to be due to an evolutionary selection effect, since 
males have higher mortalities at all ages. This approximate parity means that 
families which end up being “imbalanced” are completely normal, in the 
statistical sense, as are families which end up being “balanced.”  Since parents on 
average produce 2-3 offspring, the probability of having children with the same 
chromosomal sex is between 25-50 per cent, which is within the realm of the 
frequently occurring. Those who feel “cheated by nature” or that they are 
“playing with loaded dice” because of family “imbalance” (Pennings, ibid., 2340) 
are misunderstanding how probability works.   
“Family balancing,” or “gender-variety,” is sought when a family is deemed to be 
“imbalanced,” that is, when the “variety” of gender amongst the sibling-group is 
not sufficiently great. An “imbalanced” family is a necessary condition for the 
perceived need for “family balancing.” Therefore we first need a definition of an 
imbalanced family.   
Of course, “family balance” and “gender variety” are subjective. Some parents 
will deem their offspring-group of two daughters and a son to be balanced, some 
will find their four sons to be a balanced set of siblings, while others would 
describe the same groups as imbalanced. Our definition should therefore capture 
the “target” concept—what ethicists and legislators would have “family 
balancing” mean—rather than the “operative” concept—the range of uses which 
parents employ in practice (c.f. Haslanger 2012). There are several possible target 
definitions. Perhaps the most instructive is as follows: 
A family is “imbalanced” if there are n more siblings of one sex than the other, 
where n>1. (Which discounts the trivial imbalance of only children and odd-sized 
groups.) 
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Desiring or pursuing “balance” relies on two assumptions: (a) it is favourable to 
have (close to) equal numbers of chromosomal/genital male and female children 
within a family; (b) family sex “imbalance” can be addressed only through 
“balanced” sibling groups, not through contact with other relatives or “balanced” 
communities of non-relatives. Both of these assumptions are questionable. 
Consider that if “family” refers to a large set of extended relatives (whether 
genetically related or not) living together or spending time together regularly, it is 
not clear why the “balancing” could not be achieved by others within this group 
(cousins, say). As a target concept then, “family balancing” must be assumed to 
apply only to genetically-related offspring, from which we can infer that “family” 
in this case means the conjugate of two generations: parent(s) and genetically-
related offspring.  
Further, the “variety” on which “balance” is predicated relies on a well-articulated 
notion of similarity, and why it is undesirable in this context. Prima facie, since 
similarity, including sex-similarity, is something many people seek in their social 
interactions (e.g. Rose (1985) shows that men and women have a preference for 
same-sex friendships), it seems like any assertion that it is a negative property 
along some dimensions, for some social sub-sets, will require specific 
justification. Advocates of “family balancing” are must explain why sex-
similarity in a sibling group is deemed to be negative.  
They might argue that sex diversity is specifically important for the development 
of children. Yet since parents tend not to be concerned if their children's 
playmates share the same gender (or indeed,  are stratified by class or race, as 
very often happens), the desire for variety within a sibling group warrants further 
scrutiny. One might argue that there is something unique about the sister-brother 
relationship that is being sought. Perhaps proponents of this view believe that 
brother-sister relationships are important precursors for heterosexual adult 
relationships. Even apart from its troubling heteronormativity, this view has an 
incestuous undertone that is morally discomfiting.  
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More judiciously, proponents may believe that children need to be adequately 
prepared for a world of more than one gender. This relies on the idea that 
determining the sex of a child will guarantee the required gendered differences (a 
point I’ll return to in more detail in section four). In any case, children freely 
associate with others at school from an early age, and there is no evidence to 
suggest that being brotherless or sisterless impairs a child’s ability to associate 
with others in adult life. Indeed, using data from the Office for National Statistics 
(2013), one can estimate that 67 per cent of children in UK families are 
brotherless or sisterless. Yet the literature contains claims such as this: “it is 
socially unhealthy for a child to grow up with siblings exclusively of the same 
sex, since present day society increasingly involves people of both genders 
interacting together, both at work and play” (Heng 2006, 319). One might instead 
argue that early instances of these increasingly common interactions will 
themselves suffice as preparation for future interactions in work and play, and 
they seem to for two thirds of the population.  
If arguments pertaining to the importance of diversity to child development are  
unconvincing, as I deem them to be, this  supports the hypothesis that sex 
selection for “family balancing,” like sex selection more generally, simply serves 
a preference held by one or both of the parents. It is not a particular sibling 
relationship that is being sought, but a particular parent-child relationship. In this 
sense, it is a little misleading to use the term “family balancing.” The child, who 
cannot choose her parents, has no say in the sex-character of her inter-
generational relationships; the variety is chosen for the parent's satisfaction, and 
“family balancing” for sex selection is properly understood as another instance of 
the genetic selection of children for the satisfaction of parents' preferences. 
This intuition is borne out by empirical work exploring the chief motivations for 
family balancing.. Sharp et al. (2010), when questioning parents about their 
decision to avail themselves of sex selection technologies, discovered that “family 
balancing” was the prevailing motivation. Couples cited the desire to limit the 
size of their families, yet have a desirable offspring ratio. There was concern that 
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without sex-selection, they might be compelled to have further children in order 
to pursue “balance” and “complete” (841) the family. McGowan and Sharp (2013, 
282) confirm this socioeconomic concern about limiting family size while 
pursuing a particular sex-ratio. Another common motivation was the belief that 
the child would benefit from a female (or male) “influence” (ibid), and that 
parents would enjoy varied rearing experiences. Pressures to conform to a 
presumed ideal were reported, with parents having strongly internalised a 
particular exemplar, e.g. “We love our daughter, and we always thought it would 
be perfect to have one of each. A balanced family” (Aghajanova and Valdes 
2012) or “society has this neat little box of a boy and a girl and that's your perfect 
family” (Sharp et al. 2010, 842). In the next section I problematise the 
medicalisation of departures from the norm of this “perfect family.”   
 
3. Medicalisation 
 
One of the most interesting aspects of the “family balancing” argument remains 
unexplored in this literature. What does it mean for properties of families to be the 
target of medical interventions? Medicalisation constructs deviance as it 
simultaneously creates and enforces norms, with the credibility and authority of 
medicine conferring the ability to produce compelling notions of normality and 
abnormality.  
Both “family balancing” (the UK term) and “gender variety” (the US equivalent) 
are rhetorically-loaded terms: they are value-laden even without expansion or 
explanation. Balance and variety are manifestly favourable properties, therefore 
designating their referents in this way produces a positive, desirable impression 
before one has the details of their meaning or justification. Even prior to the 
assignation of values, the very act of identifying and naming a state, particularly 
with the legitimising power of the medical establishment, is efficacious. Attention 
is drawn to that state, rendering it conspicuous, and, in this case, apt for moral 
judgement, while before it may not have existed in any meaningful sense. As 
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Holm (2004, 32) points out, the term “family balancing” socially constructs the 
state of being in an unbalanced family. A randomly-occurring, and morally-
neutral actuality becomes a discursive site for moral deliberation. 
In other words, these terms socially construct imbalanced and unvaried families 
which may then be “treated” or “corrected” via medical technologies. Articulating 
offspring sex-distribution in terms of imbalance renders the situation ripe for 
medical intervention, where the pathologised subject is the family, rather than the 
individual. The conceptual framework of disease is transposed at the level of the 
family, and a medical intervention is presented in order to address this. Here, the 
word “imbalance” plays a key rhetorical role, since it is redolent of the fact that 
diseases and disorders can be described as bodily imbalances, so much so that one 
might even see the central task of medicine as redressing bodily imbalances. 
Speaking of “family imbalance” carries over this familiar medical paradigm of 
balancing imbalances = to the family, pathologising those with particular 
offspring sex distributions. 
The pathology  operates at two levels. First, the family is socially constructed as 
imbalanced by the terminology and hermeneutics of “family balancing,” then 
second, the parents (and, perhaps, any existing siblings) are assumed to be subject 
to some kind of actual or potential psychological disorder as a result of the 
imbalance. (As with other forms of social construction, the ensuing construction 
is causally efficacious!) Most “imbalanced” families will never know they are 
“imbalanced,” and, if told, would be indifferent to the label, or would reject its 
ideology. So one must, in addition to being aware that something is “wrong”, be 
affected by that wrong, by feeling wronged. Some writers describe the stress of 
parents whose families are “imbalanced,” a stress so great that people may refrain 
from having another child in case the “imbalance” is made worse (e.g. Robertson 
2001,  4). 
What are the consequences of medicalising the family in this way? First, it tends 
to entrench the nuclear family as a “natural,” self-evidently significant social unit, 
and normalises the isolation and self-sufficiency of that unit. Depending on one's 
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views, this may be seen as unduly traditional given the many varieties of family 
now in common existence, and the porosity of their boundaries. More 
significantly, treating family units as disparate objects whose properties cannot be 
affected by society at large is both false and morally suspect. Our genders are 
formed largely in response to our societies, and very many of our needs and 
desires are formed and met by our societies. Our families are not the only social 
units that are responsible for our welfare, nor should they be.   
The narrow application of “balance” must also be interrogated. “Balance” and 
“variety” in intimate social groups generally relate to personal properties other 
than chromosomal sex.4 There are many ways to be a “balanced” family, and 
variation within families is dependent on factors beyond the gender of siblings. 
Child development studies demonstrate that behaviours and character traits 
amongst siblings are a complex function of many interacting features, within 
which age-spacing and birth-order are at least as determinative of sibling 
interactions as sex (Minnett et al. 1983; Pepler et al. 1981). Children of different 
sexes with similar interests, personalities, and beliefs may not seem especially 
balanced. It is unclear to what extent sex-variety would guarantee or even 
increase the probability of any kind of meaningful “balance” or “variety,” and it is 
quite clear that varied chromosomes and/or genitals is not alone a defensible 
aspiration.   
If “variety” and “balance” are so important, parents would do better to try to 
obtain it in other ways. If varied rearing experiences, and a diverse household 
dynamic are the desired outcomes, then the parents would do better to control for 
aspects of intelligence, creativity, and sporting prowess, by selecting supposedly 
concomitant gene sequences. Of course, these forms of genetic selection are 
generally condemned, but if they were enacted solely to produce variety within a 
family, it would seem inconsistent to treat these choices more harshly than the 
desire to select the sex of a child, especially since they may be more likely to 
provide the variety that is desired. Alternatively, parents determined to have 
                                                 
4  In institutional settings, chromosomal sex may play a role, but that is a very different 
discussion, which I take up in section five 
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variety amongst their children might instead adopt differential parenting styles for 
each child: e.g. bring strict and stipulative with one, and lenient and liberal with 
another. Of course, moral issues abound, but it seems that worries about sex 
selection for family balancing differ from these forms of selection only in degree. 
Sorting sperm with particular presumed IQ-genes does not seem obviously 
different to sorting sperm with particular sex-genes. My point here is not an 
objection to the use of reproductive technology per se, but rather a request that we 
be cognisant of the limitations of those technologies, given the strongly 
determinative influence of socialisation on children (a point I revisit in section 4), 
and to be mindful of the way in which the attitudes underwriting selection may 
undermine the widely-held ideal of parenting children with open futures (Davis 
2009, 1997).   
It is instructive to question whether this “variety” is so important after all. There 
doesn’t seem to be anything concerning about a family in which the siblings are 
intent on emulating one another, as so often happens in families, with younger 
siblings imitating older siblings (e.g. Barr and Hayne 2003; Minnett et al. 1983)). 
Indeed, one might argue that this could create a sense of solidarity and 
commonality which would strengthen the siblings’ relationship. It seems 
inevitable that there will be similarities within sibling-groups  that might not be 
desirable within a community as a whole. This is one reason why we (should) 
actively seek diversity in our communities, and if we can achieve it, there seems 
to be no reason to be concerned about a degree of  unavoidable similarity within 
families.  
Sex selection for reasons of family balancing is a way of using medical 
technologies to determine the sex distribution within a family, even though there 
is not sufficient concern about welfare to justify medical intervention. Using 
medical technologies to determine the properties of a collection of people, such as 
a family, for non-medical reasons, is clearly a case of medicalisation. The ethics 
of medicalisation centres on the concern that medical interventions applied in 
non-medical contexts, and to non-medical subjects, may become sufficiently 
common that people become dependent upon them, and are less able to cope with 
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aspects of their lives that are entirely natural (Illich 1976). In this sense, the 
medicalisation of “family imbalance” may be seen as causing harm. Employing 
medical authority in the portrayal of particular families as aberrant or deficient 
seems intuitively dishonest, and is certainly unproductive from a medical 
perspective in the sense of producing more, rather than less, pathologised 
subjects. 
 
4. Heteronormativity 
 
The most obvious harm and serious inflicted by sex selection for family balancing 
is the entrenchment of heteronormativity. Heteronormativity is shorthand for the 
conjunction of the following independent but related beliefs: (a) there are only 
two legitimate sexes—male and female—which are determined at 
conception/birth and are determinative of particular behaviours and properties, 
which are “natural” to that sex; (b) there are only two legitimate genders—man 
and women—and they match up to the two sexes in that order, and are 
determinative of behaviours and roles; (c) either the most, or the only, legitimate, 
sexual relations are between people of “opposite” sexes (and ipso facto, in 
heteronormative terms, genders) according to this schema.  Heteronormativity is 
therefore the belief that the sex-gender-sexuality binary is real, immutable, and 
definitive of human beings and their relationships. 
Heteronormativity is a set of harmful social norms. It imposes its harms in several 
ways. First, it delegitimises people who do not conform to any of (a), (b) and (c), 
that is: intersex people, trans-people, gender-fluid people, non-binary people, and 
all people with non-normative sexualities. It does so through passive processes of 
ignoring or failing to recognise, but more often actively via erasure and silencing, 
employing shaming and violence as punishment for non-compliance.  
Second, heteronormativity inflicts harms via (b):  the association of particular 
roles and behaviours with particular genders. These roles and behaviours are 
socially constructed and therefore contingent, but they are not evenly or randomly 
distributed across the genders. Society is organised in a way that systematically 
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privileges men and males and oppresses women and female, both overtly and 
implicitly. This structural inequality is known as “patriarchy,” and is global and 
pervasive. Symptoms of patriarchy are evident in e.g. the global pay-gap, the 
limited range of employment, educational and leisure opportunities afforded to 
women as compared with their male counterparts, the undervaluing of female 
babies (consider female foeticide), the violence and control exercised over 
women, and the way in which women's sexual autonomy is limited or denied. 
Men have more social power, which means that social possibilities which are 
respected and viewed positively are usually associated with men, while social 
possibilities that are limited, demeaning, and undesirable are associated with 
women. So whilst both sides of the binary are restricted by the properties and 
roles that are normative for them, men's options are more rewarding, valued, and 
extensive than women's. Sexism describes the harms women experience as a 
result of heteronormativity and patriarchy. 
In the next three subsections, I explore the ways in which heteronormativity and 
patriarchy collude so that sex selection, even for “family balancing,” is 
problematic.  I will consider the way in which sex selection for “family 
balancing” exhibits and entrenches sexism (4.1), homophobia (4.2), and 
transphobia (4.3).  
 
4.1 Sexism 
Much of the literature on sex selection betrays a striking misunderstanding of 
sexism, and a rather surprising disregard for the large and rigorous body of 
feminist scholarship which provides ample choice with respect to definitions and 
examples of sexism. Instead, several prominent writers make the blunder which 
philosophy undergraduates are warned against, and use loose approximations, or 
worse, dictionary definitions of sexism (e.g. Robertson (2001, 5) bases his 
understanding of sexism on the Compact Oxford English Dictionary’s definition), 
rather than consulting an academic text. As a result, they end up with thin, 
inadequate, and outright false definitions, which may be faithful to colloquial 
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usages of the term, but are inadequate bases for establishing philosophical 
arguments.  
Consider the following contention, which I have distilled from its various 
equivalent appearances in the literature: 
 Family balancing addresses “sex-imbalance” amongst a sibling group, therefore 
it cannot be sexist, since sexism is a preference for one sex. 
Other baffling, unjustified claims include this one (Leiter 2014, p.2): “the goal is 
for gender variety in a family, and is frequently motivated by the female partner, 
and thus is not inherently sexist, as it may be motivated by the desire to rear 
children of both genders.” Is the author claiming that women cannot be sexist? 
Use of the determinate article also indicates an assumption of heterosexuality. 
Further, the assumption seems to be that “the female partner” will be responsible 
for the child-rearing.  
Likewise, Dickens (2002, 336) claims that sex selection is “clearly sexual, but not 
necessarily sexist” without exploring the possibility (or, as it will likely turn out, 
impossibility) of a non-medical preference being sexual yet not sexist. 
In fact, this is not the correct definition of sexism, which is the crux of why these 
arguments fail. Sexism relates to the existence of rigid, unequal, and prescriptive 
gender roles, and the way in which privilege and oppression accrue on each side 
of the aforementioned “heterosexual matrix” (Butler 1990).  
Consider, for example, that sexism towards women could be consistent with 
universal daughter preference. Parents might believe that girls are docile and 
naturally suited to housework, and desire a daughter in order to have additional 
help around the home. Or they might believe that boys are more academic and 
likely to require educational fees, in which case a daughter would be more 
economical. These are sexist logics which nonetheless ground daughter-
preference. The aim of this work is not to merely problematize son-preference, 
but also to problematize daughter-preference, on the grounds that a sex-preference 
of any kind contributes to the harm caused by restrictive gender roles.  
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Offspring sex-preference does not obviously hurt people of any gender, but 
gender roles unambiguously do. And since parents requesting sex selection for 
family balancing cite their desire for sex-varied rearing experiences (Robertson 
2001; Steinbock 2002), this may be seen as an intention to reinforce, or collude 
with, harmful gender roles. As Mudde (2010, 563) puts it: “Preferring one sex 
over the other in our future children and acting on that preference forces parents 
to place a certain kind of value on gender – and expresses a kind of desire 
powerful enough to motivate them to try to ensure, with reliable methods, the 
gender of their child.” 
In this case, the justifications given in the literature rely on a binary in rearing 
experiences. This, in turn, relies on the heteronormative idea that biologically 
female children afford parents a rearing experience that one would expect from a 
child who is gendered as a girl. It pays to try to spell out what is meant by this. 
Any set of characteristics that one can think to list as being typical of a “girl” as 
opposed to a “female” generate immediate discomfort—they are very obviously 
rehearsals of stereotypes. (The same goes for male-sexed children.) That these 
stereotyped qualities are in fact what is desired and expected by many parents is 
evidenced by empirical studies which reveal them as stated justifications for sex 
preferences (c.f. Browne 2017a; Lowe 2015).  As a Human Genetics Alert 
campaign document asks: “In how many cases where parents are ‘desperate for a 
girl’ will they be hoping for a loud tomboy that grows up to be an engineer?” 
The same arguments can be made in relation to the desire for children to have 
“varied” sibling experiences (as discussed in section two). Robertson suggests 
that “children learn important lessons from having siblings of the opposite 
gender” (2004, 271), and Pennings (1996, 2342) submits that “the presence of 
siblings of the other sex might promote mutual understanding among the 
children.” Yet that could only be the case if the parents were quite sure that the 
other sibling would not be able to personally acquire certain valuable knowledge 
or experiences on the basis of their sex, which would either reflect badly on their 
parenting, or suggest that the knowledge in question relates only to the one 
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substantive difference—that of genitals—whose relevance to children is minor 
and questionable.    
There seems to be a misunderstanding in the literature about the way in which 
rearing experiences are framed, and who determines their character. Brain 
plasticity is now a paradigm within the neuroscience of development: it is 
understood that while certain specific (non-gendered) potentialities may be 
genetically conferred, much of what a child becomes is a result of their early 
experiences. Further, innate brain-sex differences have been debunked time and 
again (Vidal 2005, 2012; Caplan and Caplan, 2005; Fausto-Sterling 1992, 2000; 
Seavilleklein and Sherwin 2007). As such, when Robertson (2001, 7) says 
“individuals could prefer to have a boy rather than a girl because of the relational 
and rearing experiences he will provide” this is an inversion of what will actually 
happen, which is that parental engagement will, in the first instance,5 determine 
whether the male child becomes a “boy” in the stereotypical sense, while the male 
child will serve as a blank slate whose individual potentialities will not yet be 
gendered. Or equivalently troublingly consider Wilkinson and Garrard’s (2013, 
29) contention that: “the sexes differ, and may offer different possible kinds of 
parent-child relationships.” 
Wilkinson (2008) makes the distinction between sexism as supremacism and 
sexism as stereotyping, arguing that while supremacist motivations may not be 
present, any sex preference necessarily relies on stereotyping. Whilst this prima 
facie a helpful distinction, it rests on something of a false dichotomy, because 
                                                 
5  I say “in the first instance” because some of the most influential and robust gendering of 
small children will be enacted by influences outside the home, and will likely happen in spite of  
parents’ aspirations towards gender-neutral parenting. That is “prospective sex selectors must 
make their decisions in the real social world, an environment that may well be sexist and which 
will almost certainly impact on future children’s characters whether the parents like it or not” 
(Wilkinson 2008, 387). One then might argue the following: I don’t intend to gender my children, 
but I know that they will likely nonetheless end up gendered in accordance with how their sexed-
bodies are construed. I do not want a child who might be violent, thoughtless, and irresponsible, as 
young men are often socialised to be, and I do not feel that my parenting can offset this powerful 
norm. I am therefore selecting a female child. This is an important argument, but note that it does 
nothing to undermine arguments against sex selection for family balancing specifically, since 
parents who want variably gendered children are likely to encourage gendered properties 
alongside, and in accordance with, external influences.  
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sex-stereotyping is always supremacist, since the stereotypes which delimit the 
lives of women are more constraining to their life options, and more antithetical to 
the possibility of happiness, fulfilment, and self-determination. As such, 
stereotyping, and any medical practice which draws uncritically on the false, 
outdated science on which those stereotypes depend, harms women particularly. 
As de Melo-Martín (2013, 11) puts it: “it seems reasonable to believe that the 
consolidation—through the blessing of modern science and  medicine—of  such  
expectations  can  serve  only  to  perpetuate  this  limitation of life choices and to 
further injustice.” 
4.2 Homophobia 
For a rational agent to prefer sex-variety in a sibling-group, sex-variety must be 
considered to be preferable to sex-homogeneity in that context. By extension, 
absent arguments which make clear the distinction, sex-variety in other familial 
subsets might also be presumed to be preferable. If one generation of the nuclear 
family unit is deemed to be superior when sex-varied, one might extrapolate that 
other generations are too. This implies that sex-varied parental subsets are also 
preferred, that is, heterosexual parents groups are preferred. 
After all, if we allow that parents are justified in their desire for sex-varied 
children, shouldn’t we also allow that children also be justified in a desire to be 
raised by sex-varied adults, even if they cannot enact that desire? Couldn't 
commentators claim that just as parents have the right to sex-varied rearing 
experiences, so too do children have the right to sex-varied parental role models? 
The case may even seem stronger that way around, since parents are more 
necessary and influential to children than children are to parents. Yet this 
conclusion is undoubtedly discriminatory and offensive to same-sex parents, and 
to same-sex couples more generally. Of course, this argument proceeds merely 
via analogy, and that analogy is perhaps weakened by the fact that parents and 
sibling-groups are very different social units. One cannot infer in a robust sense 
that what is preferred in relation to a sibling-group would also be preferred in 
relation to parents, nor vice versa. Yet at the very least, arguments which pertain 
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to the advantages of being raised in a “balanced” sibling group are strongly 
redolent of discourses in the public sphere which insist that child development 
requires parenting from a father and a mother (e.g. Crouch 2015; Squires 2014). 
Perhaps more persuasively, arguments which rely on the importance of sex 
variety (either to parents in relation to their offspring sex-preferences, or to 
children, with respect to their development) play into the idea that sex variety is 
an important part of family life, so much so that medical interventions may be 
sought to ensure that a parent of a particular sex experiences life with a child of a 
particular sex, or a child of a particular sex experiences life with a sibling of a 
particular sex. This norm negatively portrays some single-parent families and all 
same-sex parents, as it implies that they are unable to provide their children with a 
valuable relationship or role model. (It pays to note that harm-based arguments 
which claim that children are better off if raised by different-sex parents are not 
borne out by the empirical data. Studies show that children of same-sex parents 
are not disadvantaged with respect to their peers (APA 2005; Patterson 1992).) 
For same-sex couples this norm also signals that their relationships omit a key 
component of human flourishing –sex variety.  
To make this point more directly: any argument that a particular social unit—
whether it be a couple, a family, a sibling-group, or a friendship group—would be 
better for its members or for those they interact with if were sex/gender-varied is 
liable to be used to make more general arguments about the importance of 
sex/gender-variety in human relations that may be used to delegitimise non-
heterosexual couples, so that at the very least we should be wary of those 
arguments. As McGowan and Sharp (2012, 288) note, sex selection for family 
balancing “demonstrates that the vision of the nuclear family of a father, mother 
son, and daughter has been deeply normalized.” In short, aside from the cases of 
legitimate affirmative action I discuss in section 5, all claims that sex/gender-
variety is preferable seem to be prejudiced against non-normative couplings. This 
is not to claim that parents wishing to sex select for reasons of family balancing 
are consciously homophobic, but that the norms that their desire invokes are 
worryingly similar to those that are used to justify homophobia.  
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4.3 Transphobia 
Proponents of “family balancing” adopt a realist attitude towards the 
heteronormative matrix. Specifically, since they are invariably aiming for gender 
properties as they select sex properties, parents are acting on the belief that 
“biology is destiny,” otherwise known as biological determinism. This belief is 
empirically unfounded (see e.g. Vidal 2005, 2012); doctors perpetuating this myth 
by indulging parents' desires for particular gendered properties via the selection of 
chromosomes would be acting dishonestly (c.f. Browne 2017a).  
Asserting and thereby entrenching biological determinism marginalises trans-
people whose existence demonstrates that biological determinism is not a 
complete picture of how people experience their sex and gender identities. In 
addition, requesting a child of a particular sex/gender indicates an aversion to the 
child’s potential need to transition to another sex/gender. Selecting children for 
their sexed bodies or gender expression is antithetical to their potential need to 
transition away from that expression/body. 
In a paper which explores the virtue ethics of parenting, McDougall (2005, 604) 
presents a thought experiment in which a bacterial infection initiates a sex 
inversion process in small children. She notes that “parents who rejected their 
daughter once she became a son, or vice versa, would act wrongly, just as parents 
who rejected their child once some other medical condition had radically affected 
his or her characteristics act similarly wrongly.” 
One might reasonably argue that a parent who decides to select the sex of their 
child would not necessarily be unsupportive in the event of that child's need to 
transition. Yet it seems likely that a person whose attitude to sex and gender is 
such that they believe that selecting the desired sex will ensure a particular 
gender, so much so that they are prepared to actively ensure that they produce a 
child of that sex (at some personal inconvenience and/or cost), would be unlikely 
to also accept the view that not only do chromosomes not guarantee a particular 
gender, they also cannot guarantee a particular sex. Indeed, empirical studies 
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show that holding normative beliefs about gender, gender roles, and the sex-
gender binary (such as those held by parents who believe that sex reliably delivers 
gender traits) is a strong predictor of negative attitudes towards trans-people 
(Norton and Herek 2013; Riggs et al. 2012; Costa and Davies 2012).  In other 
words, sex selection in order to acquire particular gendered traits demonstrates a 
misunderstanding of sex and gender that is likely to carry over to situations in 
which the sex and/or gender of a child does not “align” with societal norms. 
Again, this is not to claim that such parents are actively transphobic, but rather 
that their decision is guided by a similar logic to that which undermines trans-
people by reinforcing the sex-gender binary.   
An interesting question arises from these reflections. Should parents be permitted 
to select intersex children?  Intersex people—who represent up to 4 per cent of the 
population— are not properly characterised as medically male or female (Fausto-
Sterling 1993), since (any combination of) their genitals, chromosomes, gonads, 
or hormones fall outside the confines of the sex binary. Intersex children occur 
naturally, and often do not have any associated medical conditions (in many cases 
sexual function and even fertility are intact), though all too often intersex bodies 
are immediately pathologised and subject to “corrective” surgery.  
If a child with a particular chromosomal sex is exposed to high levels of 
hormones in utero, the subsequent child may present ambiguous sexual organs. In 
this way one could contrive an “intersex” child,  preserving the child’s fertility 
and sexual function. Presumably this stands as the ultimate in the sex/gender 
“variety” that some parents so revere: in principle, with careful calibration, one 
could produce a series of children, each with a unique sex.   
Most would not hesitate to condemn a decision to deliberately produce an intersex 
child. They might cite harm-based arguments akin to those used to critique 
Sharon Duchesneau and Candy McCullough’s decision to intentionally produce a 
deaf child (Sandel 2009, 1). Indeed, intersexuality may be limiting in a world 
whose norms centre on a binary of genital presentation.6 Yet choosing a female 
                                                 
6 Sparrow (2013) carefully considers the ethics of the inverse situation: that of selecting against 
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child in a world in which female bodies are so limited by violence (e.g. a third of 
women globally experience physical or sexual violence at some point (UN 2016)) 
seems troubling too. The latter seems more acceptable only because there are 
more females than there are intersex or Deaf people, so it is not a numerically 
marginal group, even if females are socially marginal. But that is a matter of 
degree not kind, and in all three cases the first priority is presumably to limit the 
harms against these groups, not limit their numbers.  
Regardless, it is likely that many objections would note that such an intervention 
is not natural (even if intersex usually occurs naturally), that children should be 
accepted whatever the details of their sex, and that it is strange and harmful to be 
so fixated on the genitals or chromosomes of a child. All of which reflect back on 
those wishing to select normative sexes for their children.  
My point is that sex/gender variety is not what is being sought or celebrated. If it 
was, the existence (and perhaps production) of children of many different sexes, 
and associated genders, would be widely tolerated. As it is, parents desiring sex 
selection for reasons for family balancing are pursuing just two fixed sexes, from 
which they intend for fixed gender archetypes to stem.  
All in all, the literature on sex selection is severely wanting in its understanding of 
sex and gender, and the harms that are inherent to these concepts, particularly 
with regard to the context of heteronormativity within which they acquire their 
sense. Once understood, it is clear that those who believe that sex is sufficiently 
important to form the basis of a decision about what sort of child to raise are 
acting upon a social difference they erroneously perceive to be intrinsic to the 
world, which they intend to reproduce, thereby further establishing its 
(misguided) claim to naturalness.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
intersex chromosomes, carefully weighing the virtue of challenging the sex binary by resisting the 
reduction of the intersex population against the cost of personal suffering (to parents and children) 
due to the marginalisation of non-normative genitals. He makes the important point that the 
“political project of combating such injustices, seems to demand that parents sacrifice the interests 
of their children for the sake of the larger social good” (34). I find this point compelling and 
uncomfortable (as does he), but do not have space to explore it further here.  
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5. A misuse of affirmative action 
 
Affirmative action, also known as “positive discrimination” involves intervention 
into the representation of particular human characteristics within a group of 
interest. This is normally achieved by the imposition of quotas which ensure that 
people with particular characteristics constitute a particular proportion of the total 
population. The characteristics in question are normally selected because they 
have not historically been satisfactorily represented within that population, 
therefore quotas artificially over-represent compared with “random” (or, non-
quota-driven) occurrences of those characteristics.  
Quotas plainly are not designed to simply increase diversity along all dimensions, 
rather, they are generally justified by virtue of their (in principle) capacity to 
incrementally correct for polarities produced as a result of structural oppression. 
As a rule, quotas are introduced only where misrepresentation is harmful to the 
group in question. If there is a low occurrence of people with blue eyes within the 
student population of a university, that would not signal a bias against blue-eyed 
people. Rather, one would be justified in assuming that the under-representation 
was random, since blue eyes do not affect university admissions processes, and 
are not likely to have adversely affected people's lives prior to applying to 
university. In such cases, quotas would not be justifiable. Equally, if Muslim 
women were under-represented in impoverished demographics, it wouldn't make 
sense to set a quota to increase their representation, since being poor is not 
deemed to be in anybody's best interests. This is in spite of the fact that Muslim 
women are subject to structural oppression more generally.   
To summarise: quotas are justifiable in cases in which (a) the under-
representation of the characteristic is a result of a structural exclusion, (b) the 
exclusion of that particular group of people from the population in question 
constitutes a harm towards those people.  
Turning to the question at hand: sex distribution in sibling groups is random, not 
structural, so there is no mandate for the use of quotas (in the absence of 
additional arguments). Further, one could not argue that it is harmful to males or 
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females as groups that they are not (proportionally) represented within the 
offspring of a particular family.  
Yet it seems that what parents who wish to “balance” their families are 
advocating could be interpreted to be a form of affirmative action, or, at the very 
least, has strong echoes of it. Further, it is ironic that were more people to 
advocate for affirmative action on the basis of  gender in its morally rightful 
places in society, (such as study, employment, and political representation) one 
might not see quite so many parents feeling the need to select children of 
particular sexes—it would not matter so much in terms of the futures available to 
that child.  
Given that it draws on terminology like “equal,” “fair,” “balance,” “diversity,” 
“under-representation” etc., using “family balancing” as a justification for sex 
selection of offspring seems to appropriate the terminology, and thereby the logic, 
of affirmative action, trivialising and undermining its important role in social 
transformation in particular legitimate contexts. That is, when parents bemoan the 
lack of males/females amongst their offspring, one is unavoidably reminded of 
other situations in which males/females are under-represented, and the negative 
connotations of that under-representation seem to render sex-balance an obviously 
desirable state. But that is misleading, because the arguments which underwrite 
our concern at the lack of women in government (say), or men as primary 
caregivers, simply do not carry over to sex within offspring groups. Discourses 
and policy around affirmative action and equality have successfully seeped into 
the public consciousness and have impressed upon us the importance of 
sex/gender balance, without carrying over the nuance of justification. Family 
balancing fallaciously and misleadingly capitalises on that emphasis, inheriting a 
presumed acceptability by association. This links back to the note on the 
rhetorical power of “balance” and “variety” in section three, with “balance” 
earning a similar moral valence to “equality,” and variety to “diversity.” 
Through empirical work, McGowan and Sharp (2013, 289-230) describe how 
parents seeking family balancing tend to “understand justice in individualist and 
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familial terms rather than in terms of social justice for women and girls or for 
children who are the product of sex selection.” In other words, those seeking 
family balancing do conceive of their choice as delivering justice. As such, they 
conceptualise the under-representation of a particular sex within their family as 
unjust—not to that sex as a whole, but to the parent of those children. Even if this 
is not an intentional misuse of ordinary notions of the injustice of the under-
representation of a particular sex, it is certainly a misunderstanding that 
obfuscates the issue and ignores broader social harms.     
 
6. An abuse of reproductive autonomy 
 
Those arguing for sex selection (for “family balancing” or otherwise) sometimes 
start from the belief that women should have optimal control over their 
reproductive lives in order to realise the right to bodily autonomy. The reasoning 
goes that women’s bodies should only ever be used to carry a child they have 
chosen to carry, which might be interpreted as including the right to select the sex 
of that child.  
But arguments from reproductive autonomy fail in this case for precisely the 
reason they succeed in other cases. Reproductive autonomy is defensible and 
important because it allows women to recover control of their bodies, which have 
been under the regulation of patriarchal social values, often via sexist state 
legislation. As with any right, the right to reproductive autonomy must be 
demarcated by its impingements on the freedoms of others. This open-ended, 
unlimited formulation of the “right to choose” is self-undermining. Since the right 
to choose the sex of children entrenches heteronormativity, which harms women’s 
rights in so many other ways, there is a substantive tension. And combating 
gender roles and biological determinism seems to be the more fundamental good.  
 
“Choice” has been prioritised by feminists because there has been a lack of choice 
in such a way as to undermine women’s agency and preclude their right to control 
over their own bodies. Yet when choices are won back, they must not be 
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exercised is ways that are harmful to the choices of others, via precisely the 
ideological mechanism—sexism—that was used to limit choice in the first place.  
One particular challenge within this debate is that proponents of choice are 
generally not informed by feminist values. Rather, within the literature on sex 
selection, the choice narrative is dominated by libertarian commentators (e.g. 
Harris 2005; Robertson 2001; Savalescu 1999) whose analyses are not cognisant 
of, or at the very least do not prioritise, feminist concerns. Rather, these writers 
work on the assumption that the right to personal choice is the most fundamental 
concern. What they fail to consider is the way in which some personal choices 
reinforce cultures in which other personal choices cannot easily be made. That is, 
allowing parents to choose their children’s sexes fortifies a false and harmful 
belief about what a particular sexed body can do and be in the world, and can 
offer within a parent-child relationship. Moreover, since the choice that parents 
think they are making is founded on a falsehood—that only a child of a particular 
sex can offer a particular gendered experience—this cannot be claimed to be a 
genuine enactment of autonomy, characterised as it is by false consciousness (c.f. 
Browne 2017b). Further, to the extent that their desires (intend to) constrain the 
child’s development in order to ensure the presence of particular gendered 
properties, they can be seen to be denying autonomy to others.  
Robertson (2001, 6) asks whether “the straighter path to equal rights is to respect 
female reproductive autonomy whenever it is exercised, even if particular 
exercises of autonomy are strongly influenced by the sexist norms of her 
community.” In order to see how indefensible this is, consider whether racism 
expressed by people of colour would be permissible within an anti-racist 
movement, on the basis that the voices of people of colour have been silenced. 
Within society more generally, and medicine specifically, we ought to be 
concerned with women’s reproductive autonomy, precisely because it has been 
denied because of sexism. But to permit sexism as an exercise of reproductive 
autonomy cannot be acceptable. This can be argued even from within a libertarian 
framework in which freedom in matters of personal choice is deemed to be 
axiomatic, since sexism limits all our choices, and women's particularly.  
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Still, it is important to note that resistance to regulation of sex selection often 
stems from legitimate concerns about the erosion of abortion rights more 
generally. Some of the most vocal critics of sex selection are anti-choice 
lobbyists, who have commandeered the widespread criticism of sex selective 
abortions (largely due to concerns about son preference) in order to buttress their 
anti-choice agenda (Mohapatra 2015). This, along with concerns about particular 
groups of women who may be criminalised if sex-selective abortion is made 
illegal, has led to some pro-choice interlocutors7 resisting prohibition of sex 
selective abortion, which includes for reasons of “family balancing” (Bhatia 2010; 
Moazam 2004). Of course, holding an ethical objection to sex selection for family 
balancing need not translate into a legislative ban on abortions for that reason. Yet 
one might wonder whether this can be circumvented by targeting screening, rather 
than abortion; that is, by considering not only whether new technologies ought to 
be legalised for non-medical purposes, but whether older technologies—
specifically, those of prenatal sex determination—ought to continue to be legal for 
non-medical reasons (c.f. Goodkind 1999). Browne (2017a) makes a very 
convincing case for health professionals refusing to reveal the sex of a foetus, 
since doing so is a form of misinformation (which entrenches heteronormativity), 
due to the discrepancy between the gender information the parents seek, and the 
sex information that is instead provided.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Sex selection for “family balancing” has three unwelcome consequences. It: (a) 
leads to  over-medicalisation, (b) entrenches heteronormativity, (c) appropriates 
both affirmative action and reproductive autonomy.  
Together these constitute a serious harm against all those whose freedoms are 
restricted by heteronormativity, all those who are helped by legitimate 
                                                 
7   The British Pregnancy Advisory Service (BPAS) for example, released a statement 
opposing attempts to criminalise sex selective abortions. 
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applications of affirmative action and the struggle for reproductive autonomy, and 
all those whose well-being is risked by the new ideals, distractions, and 
dependencies created by over-medicalisation. 
In short, sex/gender selection is morally problematic largely because sex/gender 
are themselves morally problematic. And reproductive autonomy is valuable 
precisely because it militates against sex-related oppression and has permitted 
women to reclaim legitimate control over their bodies. For this reason, using the 
right to reproductive autonomy as a way of defending the right to sex selection is 
question-begging: it is to use a tool for liberation in order to perpetuate the binary 
that contributed to the original oppression. 
Since sex selection for “family balancing” is generally characterised as the least 
pernicious motivation for sex selection, its indefensibility weakens the case for 
sex selection as a whole. On reflection, this should be unsurprising; it would be 
strange indeed if one found that it became morally acceptable to sex-select a child 
simply because of the existence of other children, and the particularities of their 
genitals. As it is, whatever the familial context, sex selection for non-medical 
reasons rests on some very troubling logics, and must therefore be resisted. The 
authority and infrastructure of healthcare should not be used to facilitate practices 
which play upon misunderstandings and perpetuate injustice.  
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